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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred By Granting Daily’s Motion To Suppress And By Denying The State’s
Motion For Reconsideration
A.

Introduction
In its Appellant’s brief, the state argued that the district court erred by granting Daily’s

motion to suppress evidence recovered during a traffic stop, and by denying the state’s motion
for reconsideration of that order. (See generally Appellant’s brief.) In response, Daily cited four
facts found by the district court, which, Daily asserts, demonstrates that the glove compartment
was not within the scope of the search permitted by the automobile exception and that the district
court thus did not err in granting his motion to suppress. Daily’s argument fails for the same
reason the district court’s legal analysis was erroneous – the state was not required to
demonstrate probable cause, or even specific articulable facts, indicating that there were open
containers or evidence of possession of open containers in the glove compartment. Instead, once
Officer Martin possessed probable cause to search the truck, he was entitled to search any
portion of the truck which could have concealed objects of the search, including the glove
compartment.

B.

The District Court Erred By Granting Daily’s Motion To Suppress
“Under the long-recognized automobile exception, police officers having probable cause

to believe that an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime may search the
automobile without a warrant.” State v. Loman, 153 Idaho 573, 575, 287 P.3d 210, 212 (Ct. App.
2012) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho
894, 897-898, 821 P.2d 949, 952-953 (1991); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 61, 266 P.3d 1161,
1166 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 120, 266 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct. App. 2011);
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State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 599, 237 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Ct. App. 2010)). If probable cause
exists to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, the search of any area of the
vehicle in which the evidence might be found is authorized. Johnson, 152 Idaho at 61, 266 P.3d
at 1166 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–821 (1982)). When an officer observes
contraband in plain view inside a vehicle, the officer is justified under the automobile exception
in searching the vehicle for additional contraband, as long as the scope of the search is limited to
“only those places where such contraband might reasonably be found.” State v. Anderson, 2015
WL 7204541, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App., November 17, 2015).
In this case, the state argued that the district court’s analysis was erroneous because the
court: (1) utilized the “minor or innocuous” nature of an open container misdemeanor crime to
inform its Fourth Amendment analysis; (2) analyzed and considered the officers’ subjective
motives for the search; and (3) based its conclusion on a determination that the state failed to
demonstrate that Officer Martin lacked probable cause, or some other articulable and
particularized suspicion, to search the glove box specifically.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)

Further, the state argued that application of the correct legal standards demonstrated that the
officers had lawful authority under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to search
the glove compartment because the compartment was an area where “such contraband might
reasonably be found” or which “may conceal the object of the search.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.1011.)
In response, Daily does not directly respond to the state’s arguments regarding the legal
standards utilized by the district court. Instead, Daily relies upon four factual findings made by
the court, which, Daily asserts, demonstrate that the court “did not make a legal error, but
properly considered whether the search of the locked glove compartment was within the scope of
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the search permitted by the automobile exception.” (Respondent’s brief, pp.6-7.) Specifically,
the district court found: (1) Daily did not dispose of the open container found in the center
console during the approximately eight minutes Daily was left alone in his truck while Officer
Martin was waiting for a backup officer, and thus, presumably, the open container discovered in
plain view by Officer Martin would not be found in the glove compartment; (2) Officer Martin
did not observe any liquid or odor of alcohol emanating from either the vehicle or the glove
compartment at any time; (3) Daily was driving alone in the truck and could presumably only
drink one open container of alcohol at a time; and (4) while Officer Martin testified that he
previously discovered open containers of alcohol in glove compartments, on those previous
occasions, “it was a type [of container] that could be resealed, and not a non-resealable can such
as those found in Daily’s vehicle.” (Id. (citing R., pp.88-89).)
The facts found by the district court do not demonstrate that Officer Martin’s search of
the glove compartment was unlawful. The relevant question before the court was not whether
there was some particular fact, or the absence of fact, which demonstrated a likelihood that
additional open containers would be found in the glove compartment. As Daily acknowledges
on appeal (Respondent’s brief, p.5), by locating the open container in plain view in the center
console, Officer Martin already possessed probable cause that the truck contained open
containers or evidence of Daily’s possession thereof. At this point, the restrictions on Officer
Martin’s search of the truck were limited, and the state was not required to demonstrate
additional facts justifying a search of the glove compartment or any other portion of the vehicle
in which open containers or evidence of possession of open containers might be found. In
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-823 (1982), the United States Supreme Court
explained:
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A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in
which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility
that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.
Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons
also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which
the weapon might be found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for
marihuana would also authorize the opening of packages found inside. A warrant
to search a vehicle would support a search of every part of the vehicle that might
contain the object of the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and when
its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between
closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or between glove
compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of
the task at hand.
…
The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower – and
no broader – than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by
probable cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search
otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize.
(footnotes omitted); see also Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302 (extending the Ross rule to searches of
containers belonging to passengers and holding, “[w]hen there is probable cause to search for
contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers – like customs officials in the founding era
– to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for
each one. A passenger’s personal belongings, just like the driver’s belongings or containers
attached to the car like a glove compartment, are ‘in’ the car, and the officer has probable cause
to search for contraband in the car.”).
The lawful scope of Officer Martin’s search was no narrower and no broader than the
scope of a search that would have been authorized had he possessed a warrant to search the
truck. Therefore, just as an officer executing a search warrant on a house does not need to
demonstrate separate articulable facts to justify the search of each closet, drawer, or container
which might contain the objects of the search warrant, the same is true when an officer conducts
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a search of a car pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Similarly, just
as Officer Martin would be lawfully permitted to search the glove compartment had he possessed
a warrant to search the truck for open containers or evidence of open containers, he was likewise
entitled to search the glove compartment pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.
The state submits that the primary consideration in determining the scope of a search
authorized by a warrant or the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is simply
whether the space or container searched is physically capable of concealing the object of the
search. See, e.g., Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 (“Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen
lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom,
probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify
a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk
of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.”);
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (“We hold that police officers with probable cause to search a car
may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of
the search.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487 (1985) (“We note that
in this case there was probable cause to believe that the trucks contained contraband and there is
no plausible argument that the object of the search could not have been concealed in the
packages.”); State v. Fix, 730 P.2d 601, 604 (Or. App. 1986) (“The officers had probable cause to
believe that the two male passengers had committed a crime and that evidence of that crime (the
guns) would be in the truck. Defendant’s purse was large enough to contain a gun. The search
[of the purse] was lawful.”); see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364,
388 (2009) (Thomas, J. dissenting in part) (“The Court has generally held that the reasonableness
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of a search’s scope depends only on whether it is limited to the area that is capable of concealing
the object of the search.”). In the present case, because the glove compartment was capable of
concealing open containers or evidence of Daily’s possession thereof, the compartment was
within the lawful scope of Officer Martin’s search.
Further, even to the extent that the factual findings made by the district court and relied
upon by Daily on appeal have some limited relevance to the question of the scope of Officer
Martin’s search, these findings do not demonstrate that the search of the glove compartment was
unlawful. Three of the four factual findings 1 Daily relies on illustrate only the absence of some
fact which, if present, would have provided additional cause to believe that the glove
compartment specifically contained contraband. For all of the reasons discussed above, the state
was not required to demonstrate the existence of such individualized, articulable facts to justify
the search of the glove compartment. Finally, the district court’s finding that Daily was traveling
alone, and that an individual person “could presumably only drink one open container at a time”
(Respondent’s brief, p.6), necessarily implies that an open container of alcohol found in plain
view of a vehicle containing only one individual does not establish probable cause to search the
entire truck. As Daily has acknowledged (Respondent’s brief, p.5), this is not the case, and
Officer Martin had probable cause to believe that Daily’s truck contained contraband or evidence
of contraband.
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Specifically, these findings consist of the following: (1) Daily did not dispose of the open
container found in plain view in the center console; (2) Officer Martin did not observe liquid or
odor of alcohol emanating from the glove compartment; and (3) Officer Martin did not
specifically testify that he had discovered non-resealable cans of alcohol in glove compartments
in prior traffic stops. (Respondent’s brief, pp.6-7.)
6

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court’s order granting
Daily’s motion to suppress and the district court’s order denying the state’s motion for
reconsideration, and to remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Mark W. Olson__________________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of March, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT by emailing an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Mark W. Olson__________________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/dd

7

